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1I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout their Opposition (“Opp.”), Plaintiffs try to avoid Section 230 and its crucial 
protections for Internet free speech.  They say little about the statute or its purposes, while 
admitting the two key facts that establish Section 230 immunity, i.e., third parties created and 
developed the ads about Plaintiffs, and Backpage.com is not an “information content provider.”  
Plaintiffs’ theme now is that they are not suing about the ads concerning them, but instead 
about Backpage.com’s “business decisions and conduct” generally.  If this is the case, the Court 
should dismiss the claims because Plaintiffs have no standing, and they cannot merely attack the 
“construct and operation” of a website they do not like.  Universal Commc’n Sys. Inc. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420-21 (1st Cir. 2007).  Allowing Plaintiffs to assert such generic claims 
about Backpage.com’s features, editorial decisions and review processes would be an egregious 
example of a “heckler’s veto,” which Section 230 and the First Amendment forbid.  
II. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Can Only Be Based on the Ads About Them and Thus 
Seek to Treat Backpage.com as the “Publisher or Speaker” of User Content.
First, it is notable what Plaintiffs concede and do not contest. As Backpage.com 
explained (“Memo”):  (1) Section 230 aims to promote free speech and encourage self-policing,
Memo at 9-10; (2) application of the law turns on who created or developed the specific content 
from which the claims arise, id. at 13-15; (3) plaintiffs cannot avoid the law by attacking a 
website as a whole or challenging its “construct and operation,” id.; (4) they also cannot defeat 
immunity by alleging a site “encourages” or “promotes” unlawful or criminal content or had 
notice of such content, id. at 15-20.  Plaintiffs do not dispute any of this.  More important, they 
concede they do not claim “that Backpage.com is an information content provider,” Opp. at 15 
n.5, yet that is the only basis for suit against a website for harms from third-party content.  Jones 
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2v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC¸ 755 F.3d 398, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2014).
Rather than address the uniform Section 230 case law, Plaintiffs argue their claims “do not 
treat Defendants as a publisher,” are “wholly independent of the publication of the ad[s],” and 
would survive “even if the ad[s] had never been posted.”  Opp. at 15-17.  To support this generic
attack, they point to common website features on Backpage.com, see Opp. at 9, yet do not allege 
any of these features had anything to do with what happened to them.  This violates the 
“irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing:  injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  Under Plaintiffs’ theory, someone
who never used a website, was never the subject of any material on the site, and never suffered 
injury could still sue.  Plaintiffs cannot act as self-appointed censors of the Internet.
Regardless, this motion turns on the allegations of the Complaint, not Plaintiffs’ 
characterizations.  In the Complaint, Plaintiffs made numerous allegations that their claims are 
based on the ads about them.  See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 74, 75, 78, 80, 82, 83, 87, 93-95, 100-102.  The 
harm Plaintiffs allege is the abuse committed by the pimps and others, which they claim resulted 
from the ads. Id. ¶¶ 112, 113, 119, 126.  Otherwise, the Complaint attacks Backpage.com’s 
actions as a publisher, assailing features of the website, restrictions on content, and review and 
screening processes.  See id. ¶¶ 35, 38-39, 41-42, 47-60, 54-58.  
Plaintiffs are not the first to try to evade Section 230 by arguing their claims challenge a 
website’s conduct rather than publication of user content.  But “courts repeatedly have rejected 
attempts to recharacterize claims fundamentally based on the posting of online information in 
order to avoid § 230’s prohibition on ‘treat[ing] [the defendant] as a ‘publisher’ of information.’”  
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).  Thus, for 
example, Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), rejected a minor’s claim about 
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3abuse she suffered after meeting a man on the MySpace website.  Although the plaintiff argued 
her claims did not treat Myspace as a publisher but instead concerned the site’s conduct, the Fifth 
Circuit found “this artful pleading to be disingenuous” because the claims fundamentally were 
“directed toward MySpace in its publishing, editorial, and/or screening capacities.”  Id. at 419-
20.  As many other cases hold, in applying Section 230, courts must focus on the fundamental 
nature of plaintiffs’ claims—and when the claims stem from third-party content, they are barred.
1
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ attacks about Backpage.com’s conduct concern its actions as a 
publisher in deciding what user content to disseminate, what to restrict, and how to screen and 
monitor.  All these activities are within the heart of Section 230.  No matter how artful their 
pleading, Plaintiffs challenge the “construct and operation” of Backpage.com, which is as 
immune under Section 230 as the publication of any particular post.  Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419.  
For this reason, Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014), is 
inapposite. See Opp. at 16.  There, a woman who posted a profile on a modeling website sued the 
site operator when she was sexually assaulted by two men who contacted her through the site.  
She asserted a claim under a California statute imposing a duty to warn on a person with a 
“special relationship” to another.  Id. at 896.  Expressing skepticism whether the law applied (an 
issue not before the court), id., the Ninth Circuit held Section 230 did not bar the claim because it 
did not arise from content posted on the website or the site’s “efforts, or lack thereof, to edit or 
remove user generated content,” id. at 898.  In sum, the claim in Internet Brands was not based on 
                                                
1
See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (“fundamental tort claim is that 
AOL was negligent in promulgating harmful content”); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 
1193, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (claims fundamentally rested on Google’s “general content policy”); 
Beckman v. Match.com, 2013 WL 2355512, at *6 (D. Nev. May 29, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s claims … 
are actually challenging the publication of the profile of a third-party user …, which is clearly 
immune”); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“At the end of the 
day … Plaintiff is seeking to hold SexSearch liable for its publication of third-party content and 
harms flowing from [its] dissemination.”), aff’d, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).  
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4third-party content and did not concern the website’s publisher functions, while Plaintiffs’ claims 
fundamentally are based on exactly this.
2
  
At bottom, Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the ads about them that appeared on 
Backpage.com.  This is third-party content, for which Backpage.com is immune.
3
B. The Limited Exceptions for Section 230 Immunity Do Not Apply.
Plaintiffs try to shoehorn their case into two provisions of Section 230 exempting certain 
claims, arguing they seek to “enforce” a federal criminal statute, and their claims are “not 
inconsistent” with Section 230.  Opp. at 20-25.  Again, Plaintiffs misread the law.  
Plaintiffs argue their civil claims based on federal criminal law, are “enforcement of [a] 
Federal criminal statute,” exempt under subsection 230(e)(1).  Opp. at 20-23.  Yet, six courts 
have rejected this argument, holding that Section 230 exempts only federal criminal prosecutions.  
See Memo. at 20-23.  Plaintiffs provide no contrary authority (there is none), and suggest only 
that three of the cases “are thinly and poorly reasoned.”  Opp. at 22.  As another court stated in 
addressing 18 U.S.C. § 1595:  “Of course, Plaintiffs are not prosecutors, they are civil litigants 
seeking to recover money damages ….”  David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 2012 WL 10759668, at *20 
(E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012).  Criminal laws impose punishment, while civil laws such as section 1595 
allow recompense in damages.  See M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 
1041, 1055 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (civil claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595 and 2225 sought redress rather 
                                                
2
Plaintiffs cite two cases denying dismissal of Chapter 93A claims, Opp. at 17 n.6, but in both 
the plaintiffs (unlike here) sought to hold websites liable for content the sites themselves created 
and published.  See Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2014 WL 1214828, at *9 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 24, 2014) (site could be liable for its deceptive ads); Moving & Storage, Inc. v. 
Panayotov, 2014 WL 949830, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2014) (“plaintiffs … bring causes of 
action based not on [the defendants’] publishing conduct but on [their] representations”).  
3
Plaintiffs argue Section 230 requires Backpage.com to show “good faith” for its monitoring and 
screening, Opp. at 19, yet courts have flatly rejected this argument.  See Memo at 13 n.10.
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5than punishment and thus were not exempt).
4
  Plaintiffs cannot “enforce” federal criminal laws 
(i.e., with imprisonment or criminal fines) and thus cannot invoke subsection 230(e)(1).
5
  
Plaintiffs also argue their state-law claims survive because they are “not inconsistent” 
with Section 230.  Opp. at 23-25.  But subsection 230(e)(3) permits application of laws that, like 
Section 230, bar claims based on third-party content.  To the extent Plaintiffs argue Section 230 
does not apply because they are not suing Backpage.com as a publisher, that is not true (as 
discussed), and in any event, this circular logic would render subsection 230(e)(3) meaningless.
6
C. Plaintiffs’ “Business Practices Claims” Are Deficient.
Even if Plaintiffs could evade Section 230, their so-called “Business Practices Claims”
(under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, M.G.L. c. 265, § 52(d), and M.G.L c. 93A) are wholly deficient, and 
the theory they now advance underscores fatal constitutional problems of their case.
7
Civil claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 or M.G.L. c. 265, § 51(d) require proving all the 
elements of a predicate crime.  See Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742, 755 (M.D. Pa. 2007) 
(18 U.S.C. § 2255 requires showing defendant committed underlying crime).  Thus, Plaintiffs 
                                                
4
Plaintiffs mischaracterize dicta in Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931, at *9 (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 3, 2012).  Opp. at 21.  That court did not hold a civil claim based on a federal criminal law 
is exempt from Section 230, only that “it is unclear whether § 230 would bar” such a claim.  
5
Plaintiffs’ civil claim under M.G.L. c. 265, § 51(d), based on an alleged violation of the state 
anti-trafficking act, is plainly barred under Section 230, which preempts claims under any state 
laws, civil or criminal.  Memo at 22-23.  Indeed, Massachusetts’ Attorney General admitted as 
much in a letter urging Congress to amend Section 230 to exempt state criminal laws.  See
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/739520/ags-anti-230-letter.pdf.
6
Citing Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
Plaintiffs argue a defendant must show a plaintiff’s claim is inconsistent with Section 230.  Opp. 
at 24.  Not so.  That case held only that Section 230 did not bar claims that a website facilitated 
copying of recordings under the exception for “intellectual property claims.”  Id. at 704.  
7
Plaintiffs argue Backpage.com “waived” challenges to the sufficiency of their anti-trafficking 
claims by not offering “analysis of the factual allegations in relation to the elements of the 
trafficking statutes.”  See Opp. at 2, 6.  Given the focus of the dismissal motion—that 
Backpage.com is immune from suit—it had no obligation to explain the other deficiencies in 
Plaintiffs’ claims (but did so, Memo at 17-19, as Plaintiffs recognize, Opp. at 7).
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6must show Backpage.com (1) “knowingly benefit[ed] financially” (2) “from participation in a 
venture” that (3) “engaged in an act” of sex trafficking while (4) knowing or recklessly 
disregarding that the trafficker would use force, fraud or coercion or that the victim was 
underage.  18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).  Plaintiffs allege no facts to support any of these elements.  
Their allegations about Backpage.com’s “business decisions and conduct” are insufficient 
because criminal law requires knowing participation to accomplish “a certain crime.”  Doe, 478 
F. Supp. 2d at 756 (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis in original)).  These allegations (wrong as they are) do not identify a specific sex 
trafficking incident, much less allege Backpage.com participated in a venture to accomplish it.  
At base, Plaintiffs misunderstand the anti-trafficking laws’ requirements for mens rea and 
knowing “participation in a venture,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2), or acting as a “joint venturer in 
trafficking of [a] person,” M.G.L. c. 265, § 51.  Citing cases about other laws, Plaintiffs argue
the word “participate” is a “term and concept of breadth” meaning merely “to take part” in 
something.  Opp. at 7.
8
  But courts have held that participating in a venture under 18 U.S.C. §
1591 means aiding and abetting, requiring proof the defendant “was associated with a criminal 
venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring about and sought [by] his actions to 
make it succeed.”  United States v. Afyare, 2013 WL 2643408, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. June 12, 
2013) (quoting United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978)).
9
  In other words, 
                                                
8
Plaintiffs cite Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-22 (1983), which concerned a civil 
RICO provision and did not interpret the word “participate.”  Plaintiffs also cite Negusie v. 
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 544 (2009), Opp. at 7, which addressed refugee status under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, but fail to mention they cite Justice Thomas’s dissent.  
9
See also La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., 2013 WL 6120439, at *7, 9 (Del Ch.
Nov. 8, 2013) (allegations about Hershey’s knowledge of illegal trafficking in African cocoa 
farming provided no plausible basis to claim Hershey participated in a venture to exploit child 
labor); Doe, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 756-57 (dismissing claims against church diocese for priest’s 
sexual abuse of minor where no showing the diocese shared criminal intent or sought to bring 
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7the defendant must share “in the criminal intent of the principal” and “commit[] an overt act 
designed to aid in the success of the venture.”  Id. (quoting Longoria, 569 F.2d at 425).
10
Thus, the U.S. Department of Justice and courts agree that websites cannot be criminally 
liable for publishing third-party content, unless the site knew of, participated in, and sought to 
bring about a specific crime.  DOJ’s National Coordinator for Child Exploitation Prevention and 
Interdiction testified to Congress that an “Internet provider[] like craigslist” is not “criminally 
liable for [third-party] postings unless” it “was a participant … conspiring with those who were 
misusing the site,” because “the standard for prosecution would be knowing or willful [conduct].”  
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking:  Hearing before Senate Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 215-16 (2010).  She also 
explained: “We have [the proper tools] to prosecute the guilty, that is, the people who are using 
the Internet” and cautioned against a different rule because no one “would propose closing the 
Internet.”  Id. at 216.  Courts, too, uniformly have rejected claims based on allegations that 
websites assist, promote, or aid and abet users’ criminal conduct.
11
                                                                                                                                                            
about the priest’s crimes); Stein v. World-Wide Plumbing Supply Inc., 2014 WL 6783739, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014) (dismissing section 1595 claim where complaint provided no fact
allegations defendants knew of peonage scheme); United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 44 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (noting “Judge Learned Hand’s ‘classic’ definition that an aider and abettor is one 
who associate[s] himself with the venture, … participate[s] in it as in something that he wishes to 
bring about,’ and ‘seek[s] by his action to make it succeed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10
M.G.L. c. 265, § 51(d), also refers to aiding and abetting requirements—it permits liability 
against a business entity only if it “knowingly aids or is a joint venturer in trafficking.”  See 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467, 910 N.E.2d 869 (2009) (“[J]oint venture criminal 
liability has two essential elements:  that the defendant knowingly participated in the commission 
of the crime charged, and that the defendant had or shared the required criminal intent.”).
11
See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (website did “not satisfy the 
ordinary understanding of culpable assistance to a wrongdoer, which requires a desire to promote 
the wrongful venture’s success”); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967-69 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (Craigslist not culpable for “aiding and abetting” users as it did not “cause” them to do 
anything except “in the sense that no one could post [unlawful content] if craigslist did not offer 
a forum”); M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (rejecting claims against Backpage.com under 18 
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8Nothing in the Complaint or Opposition remotely suggests Backpage.com participated in 
any venture with pimps to traffic Plaintiffs, shared any criminal intent, knew the ads when posted 
were for sex trafficking or the persons depicted were underage or coerced, or took any overt act to 
accomplish the pimps’ unlawful aims.  Plaintiffs have provided no plausible allegations to support 
any element of the anti-trafficking laws on which they base their civil claims (and they cannot).
12
Moreover, as Plaintiffs seek to couch their claims, they contravene the First Amendment.  
Plaintiffs say Backpage.com is “not meaningfully different from a hotel” that rents rooms used for 
sex trafficking.  Opp. at 10.  Plaintiffs ignore that Backpage.com’s business is to disseminate 
speech.  The First Amendment protects both the website and its users, as three courts have held in 
striking down states’ attempts to criminalize Backpage.com’s publication of escort ads.  
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275-85 (W.D. Wash. 2012); 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 828-41 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Backpage.com, 
LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *7-11 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013).  Thus, Plaintiffs cannot 
assert claims against Backpage.com absent proof it knew in advance the posts concerning 
Plaintiffs were unlawful because any other rule would severely chill speech.  See Smith v. 
California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1960) (ordinance “dispensing with any requirement of knowledge 
of the contents of the book on the part of the seller” unconstitutional because it “impose[d] a 
severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected matter”).  Indeed, given that 
Plaintiffs claim Backpage.com participated in underage sex trafficking, they would also have to 
                                                                                                                                                            
U.S.C. §§ 1595 and 2255 because plaintiff’s general allegations about website “do not describe 
the specific intent required” for criminal liability).  
12
Plaintiffs’ response about their Chapter 93A claim merits only brief mention.  Plaintiffs admit 
they did not rely on any alleged misrepresentations.  Opp. at 5.  Instead, they contend that if 
Backpage.com had not cooperated with law enforcement and reported to NCMEC, there is a 
“reasonable possibility” the site would have been shuttered and they would not have been abused 
by pimps who recruited and victimized them, id. at 3, 12.  Again, a theory of causation so 
attenuated and speculative does not plausibly allege a claim.  See Memo at 23-25.
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9show it had advance knowledge the Plaintiffs were under eighteen.  United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (interpreting statute concerning distribution of sexually 
explicit materials depicting minors to require knowledge of the minor’s age, because “a statute 
completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious 
constitutional doubts”); see also McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-78, and Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 
2d at 829-30 (applying Smith and X-Citement Video to posts on Backpage.com).  
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reading of the anti-trafficking laws (i.e., they apply to “all forms of 
knowing or reckless conduct that, in any fashion, help sex trafficking ventures to succeed,” Opp. 
at 7-8), is so overbroad it raises additional First Amendment problems because it would impose 
criminal liability on ISPs, search engines, and any other online providers if they provide services 
that could be connected in some way to sex trafficking.  See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-
83; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 830-33.  Plaintiffs’ claim they may sue a website because they do 
not like its “business decisions and conduct”— divorced from anything that happened to them—
is an egregious form of the “heckler’s veto,” which the First Amendment and Section 230 forbid.  
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997); Jones, 755 F.3d at 407.
D. Plaintiffs’ Supposed Intellectual Property Claims Are Deficient.
Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims fail because they have not alleged Backpage.com used 
photos of them for its commercial benefit (while admitting they must, Opp. at 26).
13
  Plaintiffs
note Backpage.com reviews ads before publication and point to their conclusory assertion that 
photos are “an integral part of [its] business model,” id. at 26, but this does not come close to a 
showing the site appropriated and used Plaintiffs’ photos for its own benefit (e.g., to promote the 
                                                
13
Regarding Doe 1, Plaintiffs say they “mistakenly” sued under R.I. St. § 9-1-28.1, and ask the 
Court to consider the claim under § 9-1-28 or permit amendment.  Opp. at 25 n.8.  This claim 
should be dismissed with prejudice because it is deficient under either statute.  Memo at 27 n.20. 
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site).  In fact, the Complaint admits it was the pimps who used photos to “enhance the 
effectiveness” of ads they “placed on the website.”  SAC ¶ 130.  Plaintiffs cite no case holding a 
website violates publicity rights merely by allowing users to post content including photos.
14
Doe 3 also still fails to state a copyright infringement claim.  Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
a claim for direct infringement requires a volitional act, but argue this is satisfied if a defendant 
“performs supervisory acts” to ensure material is “available on a server and posted to a website.”  
Opp. at 27-28.  But the case they cite concerned an entirely different circumstance, where an 
agent posted content at the website owner’s direction.  See Holy Transfig. Monastery, Inc. v. 
Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 56 (1st Cir. 2012).  Doe 3 bases her vicarious liability claim on allegations 
Backpage.com reviews and charges for ads, Opp. at 29, but this ignores the cases finding such 
pre-publication review is insufficient and that a site must directly benefit from the infringement.  
Memo at 29. Finally, Doe 3 has not alleged knowledge sufficient to show contributory 
infringement.  The Opposition claims defendants “were informed in writing that the image of 
Jane Doe No. 3 depicted a minor and was posted without authorization,” Opp. at 30, but in fact, 
the Complaint does not allege Plaintiffs told Backpage.com it published any photo “without 
authorization,” much less provide any notice of infringement.  See SAC ¶¶ 105-07, 102.  The 
Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ copyright claim, a patent attempt to evade Section 230.
15
  
                                                
14
Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1980), held that the fact a defendant is 
in the business of publishing for profit does not make publication of photos a commercial 
misappropriation.  Memo at 26.  Plaintiffs miss the point by arguing Backpage.com did not 
publish Plaintiffs’ photos for “a newsworthy purpose,” Opp. at 26, citing Peckham v. New Eng. 
Newspapers, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129-30 (D. Mass. 2012), which concerned a newspaper 
printing a photo on merchandise, and the only defense raised was that this use was “newsworthy.”
15
Plaintiffs argue Backpage.com is not entitled to the DMCA safe harbor, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1), 
because it failed to remove the photo upon notification and did not store the photo “at the 
direction of a user.”  Opp. at 28-29.  But Plaintiffs do not allege they notified Backpage.com of 
infringement, and simply reviewing content before it is posted does not mean it was not stored 
“at the direction of a user.”  See 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(A) (requirements for “effective” notice).
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